Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal
Volume 29 | Issue 1

Article 6

2011

The Time Has Come for a Sustainable Theory of
Fiduciary Duty in Investment
Jay Youngdahl

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Youngdahl, Jay (2011) "The Time Has Come for a Sustainable Theory of Fiduciary Duty in Investment," Hofstra Labor and
Employment Law Journal: Vol. 29: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss1/6

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Labor
and Employment Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact
lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Youngdahl: The Time Has Come for a Sustainable Theory of Fiduciary Duty in I

THE TIME HAS COME FOR A SUSTAINABLE
THEORY OF FIDUCIARY DUTY IN
INVESTMENT
By: Jay Youngdahl*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Trustees of pension and employee benefit funds today oversee
trillions of dollars held on behalf of American workers.' In their efforts
on behalf of their beneficiaries, these women and men are subject to an
exceedingly strict set of legal fiduciary duties.2 On the nature of this
standard, the famous American jurist Benjamin Cardozo opined:
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
"disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the
been kept at a level higher than that
level of conduct for fiduciaries
3
trodden by the crowd.

While a number of different trust arrangements exist today, covered
* Jay Youngdahl is a partner in Youngdahl & Citti, P.C. He is a Fellow, College of Labor and

Employment Lawyers, and a Visiting Fellow at the Initiative for Responsible Investment in the
Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard University. He represents a number of laboraffiliated benefit funds and is an Independent Trustee on the Middletown Works Hourly and
Salaried Union Health Care Fund, which provides health insurance to nearly five thousand retired
steelworkers and their families. He wishes to acknowledge the editorial assistance of Katie Grace
and the research assistance of Cassie Haynes.
1. See Peter Brady, Sarah Holden, & Erin Short, The U.S. Retirement Market, 2009, REs.
FUNDAMENTALS, May 2010, at 3 fig.l, available at www.ici.org/pdf/fm-vl9n3.pdf. Globally, the
monies accumulated for workers' benefits are extraordinarily large. Before the stock market decline
in the last quarter of 2008, just one class of trust entity, defined benefit pension funds in the United
States affiliated with unions or unionized public employers held assets in excess of $3 trillion. Id.
2. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
3. Id. (citing Wendt v. Fischer, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1926)).
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by a variety of legal schemes, certain fiduciary duties form the bedrock
in the world of trusts.4 The legal responsibilities of a fiduciary include
the foundational duties of loyalty and impartiality. 5 A fiduciary may not
act in any way adverse or contrary to the interests of the beneficiary,
from acting for her own benefit regarding certain subject matter to
engaging in a fiduciary relationship that would result in a conflict of
interest. 6 A trustee must avoid situations in which inherent strife could
exist between the personal interests of the trustee and the interests of the
beneficiaries.7 Critical to the fiduciary relationship is the requirement of
disclosure - a trustee must provide truthful and complete information to
beneficiaries placing trust in her. 8 In their activities, all fiduciaries must
exercise the entirety of their skill, care, and diligence when acting on
behalf of a beneficiary. 9 A trustee must act with discretion when
choosing whether to delegate authority and to whom and should spend
money belonging to the trust only as necessary and in reasonable
amounts that are properly within the scope of the fiduciary's investment
responsibility. l1
While the rigorous mandate to conform to these legal fiduciary
duties has been a long-standing standard of trust law," the definitional
content of the investment function of this duty has been in constant
evolution. 12 A close relationship exists between the strictures of the
investment duty and changing societal conditions. 13 Thus, adherence to
4. Persons operating in a number of different spheres must adhere to fiduciary duties, yet the
scope and meaning of such duties varies widely, often resulting in definitional ambiguity. As an
example, corporate directors are subject to fiduciary duties, but those duties are less demanding than
those in the trust context. Paddock v. Siemoneit, 218 S.W.2d 428, 431-32 (Tex. 1949). The
fiduciary duties of corporate directors, for example, allow for significantly more flexibility than
those that apply to benefit fund trustees, as "[a]cts which might well be considered breaches of trust
as to other fiduciaries have not always been so regarded in cases of corporate officers or directors."
Id. at 432. The result of these definitional difficulties is that any discussion of fiduciary duty must
begin with an understanding of the description and demands of the particular legal form in which
the duty arises.
5. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 78, 79 (2007) (defining the duties of
loyalty and impartiality, respectively). For commentary and case citations to these duties, see 1
AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS (5th ed. 2011).

6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(2).
7. Id. § 78 cmt. b (stating that a fiduciary must refrain from conduct that "might be
influenced by considerations other than the best interests of the beneficiaries").
8. Id. § 78(3).
9. See § 77(2) cmt. b.
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. j (1992).
11. See id. § 227 cmt. b.
12. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 77 IOWA L.
REv. 1151, 1154-55 (1992).
13. See id. at 1154.
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fiduciary duty is ironclad, 4 but the substance of the investment duty has
always been malleable. 5 The authors of the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts acknowledged this two decades ago when they wrote that "[t]rust
investment law should reflect and accommodate current knowledge and
concepts. It should also avoid repeating the
mistake of freezing its rules
'6
against future learning and developments."'
Given the ethical and financial gyrations of the recent past, as well
as the crisis in retirement security of America's workforce, it is time to
reexamine the composition of the fiduciary duty regarding the
investment function. As will be detailed below, serious ferment is
present in the "science" of investing today; flaws are acknowledged by
all, and many argue this theory of investing has been incompatible with
productive investment in the conditions that exist today. 17 Yet, in spite
of the recognition of these shortcomings, many lawyers continue to
blissfully counsel their trustee clients that a strict adherence to a "Wall
Street model" of investing, known as Modem Portfolio Theory, is the
only way to comply with fiduciary duty in investment.' 8 The advice is
given in spite of the absence of significant supporting legal authority. 19
The apocryphal line that is often repeated in the field is that such
lawyers tell trustees that the trustees will be sued and "lose their house"
if they deviate from the Wall Street model. 20
While it is beyond the scope of this article to thoroughly define a
new investment theory to replace the current flawed Wall Street standard
or to completely formulate a revised theory and application of the legal

14. See § 227 cmt. b.
15. See Halbach, supra note 12, at 1154.
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 17, intro, note (2007).
17. See Ben McClure, Modern Portfolio Theory: Why It's Still Hip, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 7,
2010), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/06/MPT.asp.
18. See, e.g., William G. Droms, Fiduciary Responsibilities of Investment Managers and
Trustees, FiN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1992, at 58, 62 (stating that in measuring prudence "[a]n
expert portfolio manager would be expected to manage a portfolio within the context of modem
portfolio theory").
19. See id. at 63 (noting that the law's interpretation of prudence has yet to incorporate
modem investment theory and practice).
20. In general, a trustee is liable for losses if there is a breach of duty. Hogg v. Walker, 622
A.2d 648, 653 (Del. 1993). Specifically:
If the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is chargeable with (a) any loss or depreciation
in value of the trust estate resulting from the breach of trust; or (b) any profit made by
him through the breach of trust; or (c) any profit which would have accrued to the trust
estate if there had been no breach of trust.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1959). The Department of Labor ("DOL") has the
ability to levy a monetary fine against a trustee in an ERISA regulated fund for a breach, and certain
common law legal remedies may be available as well for aggrieved beneficiaries.
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conception of fiduciary duty in investing, the time has come to begin this
project. Given the effects of their decisions on the overall economy that
boomerang toward their beneficiaries, American trustees who otherwise
comply with all aspects of their fiduciary duties must be free, without
fear of personal liability, to heed concepts of financial and social
sustainability, long-term investment return measurement, and ecological
limits to growth. As the reporter for the American Law Institute ("ALI")
wrote at the time of the publication of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts,
"expert trustees [must be liberated] to pursue challenging, rewarding,
'2
non-traditional strategies when appropriate to a particular trust. 1
Duties to beneficiaries demand no less.
II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF AMERICAN LAW OF TRUSTS
This article covers fiduciary duty as it applies to trustees who sit on
the boards of employee benefit funds. Trusts in general, and benefit
fund trusts in particular, come in many shapes and sizes. Funds that
provide retirement security to older workers receive much attention
today, given their accumulated assets and political issues involving
retirement payments to public workers.2 2 However, employee benefit
funds cover not only retirement obligations, but also other workplacerelated functions such as health care and training activities.2 3
It is important to note that the foundation of the duties of trustees in
these modem funds began long ago.24 Thus, to understand the
evolutionary nature of the concept of the fiduciary duties of trustees and
the needs of these trustees today, a short historical digression into the
rich past of trusts is useful. Simply put, a trust is an entity in which
The
money or property is held and managed on behalf of another.
21. Halbach, supra note 12, at 1155. The American Law Institute ("ALI") is composed of
leading lawyers, law professors, and judges with experience in the subject area. ALI Overview, AM.
L. INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfn?fuseaction=about.overview (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
22. See generally Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax
Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 852-55 (1987) (discussing the income security of older retired
workers, focusing on the Social Security program itself, employer-provided pensions, and
individual savings, and stressing a unified view of retirement security policy which considers
interrelationships, confluences, and potential conflicts between retirement security and tax policy
concerns).
23.

See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT'S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 255 (6th ed.

2000) (providing an overview and analysis of the various types of employee benefit plans, including
their funding and various components).
24. See Avisheh Avini, The Origins of the Modern English Trust Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REv.
1139,1140-42 (1996).
25.

Definition of Trust, THE AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
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word "fiduciary" originates from the Latin words "fides" and "fiducia,"
meaning faith and trust.26 The first trusts reminiscent of their present
form are said to have been established around the time of the Middle
Ages.27 In an attempt to protect and preserve his wealth while fighting a
war, a knight would transfer the legal ownership of his estate to a close
friend or another third party. 2' Those involved understood that the
ownership of the property would revert back to the knight upon his
return. 29 Transferring the legal title allowed the third party to effectively
manage the property and enforce the rights of the estate against all others
in the knight's absence.3 °
Critical to the trust is the separation between legal ownership and
equitable ownership. 3' This particular divide has its origins in the
English courts.32 Legal ownership was recognized and enforced through
the common law courts, while the courts of equity recognized and
enforced the equitable ownership. 3 Today, the same court generally
enforces both interests; however, the two concepts remain distinct.34
The difference between the two concepts is relatively simple:
The legal owner of the trust, the "trustee," retains the right to
possession, the privilege of use and the authority to transfer those
rights and privileges. In the eyes of the rest of the world, the trustee
looks like the owner of the property. That is to everyone except the
person or persons35for whom the money is held - the "beneficiary," the
beneficial owner.

http://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=trust&submit.x=38&submit.y=36 (last visited Jan. 6,
2012).
26. Definition
of
Fiduciary,
LAW.COM,
http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=744&bold = (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
27. BETTY LINN KRIKORIAN, FIDUCIARY STANDARDS IN PENSION AND TRUST FUND
MANAGEMENT 5 (1989). The history has been traced back even further to Roman and Salic law,
and precursors of modem trusts can be found in Islamic law. See Avini, supra note 24, at 1141.
28. ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 41-42 (6th ed. 2010).
29. Id. at 42.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. KRIKORIAN, supra note 27, at 5.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Jay Youngdahl, Address at the Harvard Law School Program for Advanced Trustee
Studies: Fiduciary Duty: Challenges to the Traditional View 5 (July 28, 2010), available at
http://hausercenter.org/iri/wp-content/uploads/201 1/01/Youngdal-Fiduciary-Duty.pdf. Under the
Uniform Trust Code ("UTC"), applicable in certain states, the term "beneficiary" is defined as "a
person that: (A) has a present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent; or (B) in a
capacity other than that of trustee, holds a power of appointment over trust property." UNIF. TRUST
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Beneficiaries retain the equitable title of trust assets and are the
recipients of the benefits of the trust property.36
In 1822, Farmers' Fire Insurance and Loan Company became the
first institution chartered in the United States in the business of trusts.37
Within the next ten years, "[c]orporate trusts developed ... to help raise
money for new business ventures. 38 In the subsequent decades, more
institutions became involved in the trust business, and many had
independent departments entirely dedicated to trust services.39
Interestingly, the next major expansion of the use of trusts came in
relation to the regulation of affairs of Native Americans.4" In 1906,
Congress passed the Burke Act, which was "intended to accelerate the
assimilation of the Indians by truncating the length of the trust period
and benefits derived therefrom for Indians determined to be
competent. '4 1 While the Act primarily affected American Indians and
their real property rights, statutory changes in this area also enabled
banks to serve as trustees. 42 In response, over one thousand banks
offered trust services by 1921.
In the 1940s, in the aftermath of the
Great Depression, employment benefit trusts became exceedingly
popular. 44 Over time, concerns about their implementation and use
arose, prompting Congress to pass the Employee Retirement and Income
Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") 45 that codified the general
responsibilities of trustees managing certain funds.46 Trust activity
continued to grow, and by the early 1980s, more than eighty percent of
CODE § 103(3) (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. 413 (2000).
36. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1622 (9th ed. 2009).
37. H. PARKER WILLIS & GEORGE W. EDWARDS, BANKING AND BUSINESS 335 (1922),
available at http://chestofbooks.com/finance/banking/Banking-And-Business/index.htmi.
The first
important American case defining the duties of trustees was decided around this time. Harvard
Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).
38.

Trusts and Trustees, REFERENCE

FOR BUS.: ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF BUS.,

2D ED.,

http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Thir-Val/Trusts-and-Trustees.html#b
(last
visited Jan. 6, 2012).
39. Id.
40. See Burke Act, ch. 2348, § 6, 34 Stat. 182, 182-83 (1906) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 349 (2006)).
41. Cnty. of Thurston v. Andrus, 586 F.2d 1212, 1219 (8th Cir. 1978).
42. See 25 U.S.C. § 161 (2006).
43. Eugene N. White, Banking Innovation in the 1920s: The Growth of National Banks'
FinancialServices, in 13 BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 92, 96 (Jeremy Atack ed., 1984),
availableat http://www.h-net.org/-business/bhcweb/publications/BEHprint/v013/p00 9 2 -pO104.pdf.
44.

JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A

POLITICAL HISTORY 45 (2004).
45. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2006)).
46. Id.
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workers with private retirement plans had defined-benefit plans.4 7
ERISA attempted to synchronize the concept of fiduciary duty
along with other parts of the administration of employee benefits law for
private sector benefit trusts. 4 8 However, similar types of public entities
operating in the various states were subject to different conceptions of
fiduciary duty in investment.4 9 In response, in 2000 the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")
made the first attempt to codify these common law practices regarding
American trusts and estates into a uniform statutory code, the Uniform
Trust Code ("UTC"). 50 As of 2011, over twenty states have adopted
some substantive form of the UTC.51 The UTC was enacted subsequent
to the Uniform Prudent Investor Act ("UPIA"), another model statute
that NCCUSL drafted. 52 As of 2008, all but five states have adopted
some form of the UPIA.53
III. TWENTIETH

CENTURY EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF FIDUCIARY

DUTY IN INVESTMENT AND THE ASCENDENCY OF MODERN PORTFOLIO
THEORY

While the application of any definition of fiduciary duty in
investment must be rigorous and unbending as Judge Cardozo observed,
the concept itself has gone through a number of iterations. However,
when considering its meaning for the trustee investing function, as with

47. See WOOTEN, supra note 44, at 277-78.
48. See id. at 257-58.
49. See id. at 258-59.
50. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 102, 7C U.L.A. 411 (2000) (defining the scope of the Code).
51. Legislative Fact Sheet
Trust
Code, UNIFORM
L.
COMMISSION,
http://www.nccusl.org/legislativefactsheet.aspx?title=trust%20code (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
52.

See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, 7B U.L.A. 16 (1994).

Under the UPIA, if a legal

question arises concerning the exercise of a trustee's fiduciary duty, it is the trial court's
responsibility to decide whether a trustee has acted with prudence regarding investments. 76 AM.
JUR. 2D Trusts § 477 (2005). In evaluating the suitability of any investment decision, a fiduciary
should take into consideration several factors, including: the monetary value of the trust, the
circumstances of the beneficiaries, the price trend and current cost of living, inflation and deflation,
the marketability of the investment, and potential tax consequences. Id.
53. Ken Ziesenheim, Guidelines for Advisors on the Uniform Prudent Investor Act,
THORNBURG

INVESTMENT

MGMT.,

http://www.thomburginvestments.com/research/articles/upia-aicpajan2008.asp (last visited Jan. 6,
2012). For an interesting view of the UPIA, see MATr TAIBBI, GRIFTOPIA 139-41 (2010). In
addition, many state legislatures have promulgated legislation that regulates practices and activities
of pension funds in their states. However, it must be observed that for purposes of the arguments
herein, in spite of these diverse legal frameworks, differences in conceptions of fiduciary duty in
investment between ERISA and non-ERISA covered funds are seldom crucial.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2011

7

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL

122

[Vol. 29:115

the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution over the last two and one-half
centuries, new facts and situations lead to new analysis of seemingly
simple legal phrases. 54
Prior to the adoption of the "Prudent Investor Rule" with its relation
to Modem Portfolio Theory, fiduciary duties looked very different. 5 In
1959, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, a book of legal precedents
produced by ALI, contained the "Prudent Man Rule" as a definitional
guide to investment decisions.5 6 This rule required trustees to invest
trust assets as a "prudent man" would invest his own estate. 7 This
standard was a significant alteration of rules that had lasted for decades,
which often stated that investments of trusts could only be made in
"safe" financial instruments, such as U.S. government bonds.58 Under
the Prudent Man Rule, a trustee must take into consideration the needs
of the beneficiaries, the needs of the principle, and the amount and
reliability of the income.59
The investment duty as defined under this Prudent Man Rule would
be hardly recognized today. For example, the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts described the following as improper investments:
(1) purchase of securities for purposes of speculation, for example,
purchase of shares of stock on margin or purchase of bonds selling at a
great discount because of uncertainty whether they will be paid on
discount because of uncertainty whether they will be paid on maturity;
(2) purchase of securities in new and untried enterprises; (3)
employment of trust property in the carrying 60on of trade or business;
(4) purchase of land or other things for resale.

54. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992) (defining the general standard
of prudent investment), with Droms, supra note 18, at 63 (suggesting that legal definitions have yet
to catch up with the developments in modem investment).
55. See generally Halbach, supra note 12, at 1151 (noting that among ALI's advisory group,
"there was a solid consensus that supported fundamental revision of the so-called 'prudent man
rule' as formulated in the original and second versions of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts and
in traditional prudent-man doctrine" in most states).
56. Seeid.at1152.
57.

Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959)).

58. See W. Brantley Phillips, Jr., Note, Chasing Down the Devil: Standards of Prudent
Investment Under the Restatement (Third)of Trusts, 54 WASH. & LEE. L. REv. 335, 340-41 (1997).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. e. The recognized overarching principal
behind this rule is that a trustee must "observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence
manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of
their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be
invested." Harvard Coll. v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. f.
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A look at the investment portfolio or any large state public
employee benefit fund today will reveal scores of investments that
would be violative of the Prudent Man Rule.61 Portfolios make all
manner of bets on speculative securities, junk bonds, stock in start-up
companies, property investments, and even the purchase of entire shaky
62
enterprises.
In 1992, ALI issued the Restatement (Third) of Trusts recognizing
the contradiction between "modem" practices of investment
management of trust assets and the dictates of the Restatement (Second)
of Trust.63 The previous Prudent Man Rule of the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts of 1959 unduly limited the investments of trustees, subjecting
them to liability if they invested in impermissible investment vehicles.64
The judges, academics, and lawyers of ALL found that the definition of
the duty in their previous volume conflicted with "modem assetmanagement practices. 65 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts enshrined
adherence to Modem Portfolio Theory, it came to be believed, as the
revised test of loyalty to proper fiduciary duty in investment.66 Benefit
61. See Leslie Joyner Bobo, Comment, Nontraditional Investments of Fiduciaries: ReExamining the Prudent Investor Rule, 33 EMORY L.J. 1067, 1080 (1984) (discussing the modem,
nontraditional approach to investment, which promotes "the pursuit of [an] investment strategy that
deviates from the conventional objectives of maximizing return and preservation of the corpus").
62. See Alec Sauchik, Note, Beyond Economically Targeted Investments: Redefining the
Legal Framework of Pension Fund Investments in Low-To-Moderate Income Residential Real
Estate, 28 FORDHAM UR13. L.J. 1923, 1931 (2001) (discussing the use of risky investment
techniques, such as speculative securities, junk bonds, and property investments, after ERISA was
passed). In addition, all types of derivatives of investment vehicles are purchased with trust funds,
including such inscrutable products as structured investment vehicles and synthetic collateralized
debt obligations ("CDOs"). See Christopher J. Miller, Note, "Don't Blame Me, Blame the
FinancialCrisis": A Survey of DismissalRulings in JOB-5 Suits for Subprime Securities Losses, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 292-93 (2011) (discussing lawsuits that arose from the widespread use of
derivatives of investment vehicles with trust funds, especially with CDOs). Many such investments
failed during the crisis of 2008 and are the subject of litigation today. See, e.g., Abu Dhabi
Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (addressing
defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs claims of fraud for defendants' use of structured
investment vehicles).
63. See Halbach, supra note 12, at 1153 (describing "[t]he need for modernization and
clarification of the prudent man rule . . . evidenced by modem trends in both state and federal
legislation, theoretical and empirical research, and a large and growing body of professional
literature").
64. See id.
65. See id. at 1153-54.
66. See id. at 1164. While Modem Portfolio Theory was enshrined into the legal duty of a
fiduciary in 1992 in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, it had been the subject of vigorous debate
and growing acceptance in the investment community for over fifteen years. In 1977, just after a
particularly difficult investment period from 1973-1974, MPT was considered a "revolution," and it
was argued that MPT proved that previous investment strategies were "inefficient, illogical, illconceived and frequently erroneous."

PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE
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trustees were counseled to use techniques that had been considered
forbidden just a few years before.67
Thus today, "[t]he trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to
invest and manage the funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in
light of the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other
circumstances of the trust.', 68 In the investment activities in which a
trustee participates, she must employ "reasonable care, skill, and
caution.,, 69 Today's common standard often evaluates prudence by
assessing the actual volatility of return, or "risk," as it is commonly
referred to in economic literature, with respect to the proper level of
such risk for a specific investment portfolio.70 In this vein, "a fiduciary
is required to diversify the investments of the plan so as to minimize the
risk of large losses. 71
However, in spite of this seemingly crystal clear responsibility of
the trustee, as well as three decades of adherence to what was considered
the scientific law of investment, MPT, the meaning of the concept of
fiduciary duty in the investment context is in ferment today. As Keith
Johnson and Frank Jan de Graaf, two practitioners and theoreticians in
this area, write, "[m]any assumptions underlying the way economists,
policymakers, and regulators have traditionally viewed pension systems
no longer apply., 72 Given the link between financial theory and
fiduciary duty in investment, if the critics of MPT are correct, the
foundation for the operative definition of fiduciary duty in investment
must be reexamined as well.
IV. CRITICISM OF MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY

The mighty revolution in investment theory, Modem Portfolio
Theory, which was seemingly an "end of history" moment, has proven
to be far from perfect in practice. Like the effect on the existing
ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET 256 (1992).

67. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. f. (1959) (outlining specific
improper trust investments), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. f. (1992)
(explaining that specific investments are never per se imprudent).
68.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227.

69. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a), 7B U.L.A. 20 (1994).
70. See, e.g., DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 756, 766 (E.D. Va. 2006)
(describing low, moderate, and high risk portfolios).
71.

SUSAN P. SEROTA & FREDERICK A. BRODIE, ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW (Susan P. Serota &

Frederick A. Brodie eds., 2d ed. 2006). In addition, under this "whole portfolio" approach, "the
standard of prudence applies to each investment as a part of the total portfolio." Id.
72. Keith L. Johnson & Frank Jan de Graaf, Modernizing Pension FundLegal Standardsfor
the Twenty-First Century, ROTMAN INT'L J. OF PENSION MGMT., Spring 2009, at 44, 44.
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investment theory in the difficult 1973-74 investing environment that
helped lead to the adoption of MPT, the recent financial difficulties have
exposed major flaws in today's predominant theory of investing and risk
aversion. In 2009, Professor Paul Woolley wrote that "[m]uch has come
to pass in financial markets during the last ten years that has been at
the prevailing academic wisdom of how capital markets
odds with
3
7

work.

Paradoxically, like other areas in which a dominant paradigm
pushes out all others, certain harmful unintended consequences have
become clear.74 Steve Lydenberg of Domini Social Investments wrote
the following:
[T]he dominant theory of investing today, Modem Portfolio Theory, is
based on a definition of success that fails to acknowledge the extent to
which investments at the portfolio level can affect the overall financial
markets. In particualr, its techniques for controlling risk at the
portfolio level--diversification, securitization, and hedging-can
actually increase market-level risks to the of finance and the economy
as a whole. In addition, the benefits that accrue from the practice of
this theory are at best part of a zero-sum game and available to only a
limited number of investors. In addtion the more investors that adopt
its practices, particularly risk-control techniques, the less likely these
Reform of this theory is not sufficient.
practices are to succeed.
75
needed.
are
Alternatives

Lydenberg further argues that the chase for more and more return,
the holy grail of MPT, has led to "increasing systemic risk through the
increase of the supply of, and demand for, risky products. 76 Core
concepts of risk failed in the onslaught of the financial crisis, an

73. Paul Woolley, Why are Financial Markets so Inefficient and Exploitative - and a
Suggested Remedy, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 121, 121 (2010), available at
http://harrl23et.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/futureoffinance-chapter31 .pdf.
74. Examples include problems associated with widespread use of common antibiotics that
have resulted in viruses that are immune to these medicines or the burgeoning problems associated
with certain herbicides and pesticides that result in unwelcome chemically resistant weeds and
plants. See Kenneth Todar, Bacterial Resistance to Antibiotics, THE MICROBIAL WORLD (2009),
http://textbookofbacteriology.net/themicrobialworld/bactresanti.html.
75. STEVE LYDENBERG, BEYOND RISK: NOTES TOWARD RESPONSIBLE ALTERNATIVES FOR
INVESTMENT THEORY 2 (2009), available at http://www.unpri.org/files/LydenbergPRI2009.pdf
76. LYDENBERG, supra note 75, at 15. Lydenberg is the Co-Founding Director of the
Initiative for Responsible Investment in the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard
University. Steve Lydenberg Profile, THE HAUSER CENTER FOR NONPROFIT ORGS. AT HARv. U.,
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hauser/people/steve-lydenberg/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
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environment in which they were predicted to succeed." While MPT
advocates the advantages of a portfolio in which different asset classes
behave differently, the underlying standard that they use encourages
copycat behavior. This "lemming" standard "makes [t]rustees hesitant
to try new approaches for fear of being different" and thus subject to
personal jeopardy. 7s Even its advocates admit that certain types of risk
that were powerfully operative in the crash of 2008 are not included in
MPT.7 9
One of the fathers of MPT, Harry Markowitz, has
acknowledged its limitations in light of the financial crash, stating:
Systematic risk, due to beta, does not diversify away; unsystematic risk
does.

This does not mean that individual securities are no longer subject to
idiosyncratic risks. It means, rather, that the systematic risk swamps
the unsystematic risk during [a crisis].

...

MPT never promised high returns
with low risk. You pays your
0

8
money and you-takes your choice.

Further problems are evident. "Short-termism" skews the duties
trustees have to beneficiaries.8s The fundamental role of all benefit
77. See LYDENBERG, supra note 75, at 15-16.
78. Youngdahl, supra note 35, at 12.
79. See id. at 9.
80. Harry M. Markowitz, Crisis Mode: Modern Portfolio Theory Under Pressure, FIN.
PROFS.' POST (June 8, 2010), http://post.nyssa.org/nyssa-news/2010/06/crisis-mode-modemportfolio-theory-under-pressure.html. The current debate within the professions of economics and
finance is ferocious. The author famous for his theory of "Black Swans," Nassim Taleb, argues that
economics is akin to medieval medicine: "Medicine used to kill more patients than it saved -just as
financial economics endangers the system by creating, not reducing, risk." Nassim Nicholas Taleb,
The
Pseudo-Science
Hurting
Markets,
FiN.
TtMES,
Oct.
23,
2007,
http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/FT-Nobel.pdf.
81. Further, basing fiduciary duty on MPT, and short term results alone, belies the depth of
the concept of fiduciary duty. Trustees have duties that are both legal and moral, including a duty
of loyalty and a duty of care. They occupy this position to serve their beneficiaries. Of course,
moral stances are complex enterprises, but in the area of pension funds, the core is that providing for
a secure retirement for our participants affirms the transcendent worth of human beings. The
dignity of the human person includes the ability to live one's retirement years in a safe and secure
financial situation. Religious figures in all faiths have noted the moral position both of being in a
fiduciary relationship with others and in the way that money is invested. Pope John Paul II wrote in
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funds is to provide benefits for the worker participants over a long-term
horizon.8 2 These funds are invested in order to protect and build upon
the assets necessary to pay off benefit liabilities that stretch out for years
in the future, making nearly all funds long-term investments.83 Yet, the
actual practice of MPT investing leads to a fetishistic focus on quarterly
results. 84 According to John Bogle, the former leader of the Vanguard
Investment Company, there is a "dominance of a culture of short-term
speculation over a culture of long-term investment."85 Mainstream
financial professions have recognized this.86 The Centre for Financial
Market Integrity, an arm of the CFA Institute that regulates many
financial professionals, has recognized that "the obsession with shortterm results by investors, asset management firms, and corporate
managers collectively leads to the unintended consequences of
destroying long-term value, decreasing market efficiency, reducing
investment returns, and impeding efforts to strengthen corporate
Even the Business Roundtable criticized "shortgovernance. ' 87
termism" in 2006, defining it as "excessive focus of some corporate
leaders, investors, and analysts on short-term, quarterly earnings and a
lack of attention to the strategy, fundamentals, and conventional
approaches to long-term value creation. 8 8
In tracing the history of the relationship of pension funds,
corporations, and investing, Thomas Croft argues that "a pension fund
may actually harm its beneficiaries if it focuses on maximizing share

the Papal Encyclical, Centesimus Annus, that investment "is always a moral and cultural choice."
Encyclical
Letter
from
Pope
John
Paul
I,
(May
1,
1991),
available at
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/johnpaulii/encyclicals/documents/hf jpii enc 01051991_centesimus-annusen.html.
John Wesley, founder of the Methodism, wrote,
"Gain all you can, without hurting either yourself or your neighbor, in soul or body." John Wesley,
The Use of Money, GLOBAL MINISTRIES, http://new.gbgm-umc.org/umhistoiy/wesley/sermons/50/
(last visited Jan. 6, 2012). Certainly this is an aspect of fiduciary duty that cannot be ignored.
82. See generally Dallas L. Salisbury, Benefit Trends: Change is Now Constant, WALL ST. J.
(2008),
http://online.wsj.com/ad/employeebenefits-benefit-trends.html
(describing
employee
benefit trends and the ways in which employees pay into benefit funds).
83. See id.
84. See DEAN KREHMEYER ET AL., BREAKING THE SHORT-TERM CYCLE 3 (2006), available
at http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2006.nl.4194 (describing .the actions corporate
managers take in order to reach "quarterly earnings number[s]," such as cuts in research, asset sales,
and avoidance of strategic investments).
85. John C. Bogle, The Clash of Cultures, J. OF PORTFOLIO MGMT., Spring 2011, at 14, 23.
86. See id. at 22-24 (acknowledging that mutual funds, index funds, and the scientific and
technological industries have recognized this trend).
87. DEAN KREHMEYER ET AL., supra note 84, at 1.

88.

Id. at 3.
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value on a firm-by-firm basis. 8 9 Yet, this type of analysis is at the
bedrock of the application of MPT. For example, Croft argues:
[T]he fund's equity portfolio may decline in aggregate value when the
companies it holds work to increase their profits by imposing external
costs on and withholding external benefits from each other. Such
short-term strategies hurt a "universal shareowner" such as a large
public pension fund that holds equity in thousands of firms,
owns
bonds and real estate, and whose beneficiaries have interests not only
as indirect stockholders90 but also as "stakeholders" - employees,
consumers, and citizens.
MPT has given trustees, financial advisors, and their lawyers a false
sense of security. Peter L. Bernstein, the foremost chronicler of the
investment theory of MPT has written, "Perhaps the most remarkable
feature of these ideas is the indomitable power of their influence on
investment decisions, even though the theories failed to survive a batter
of empirical testing." 91 As John Bogle has argued, slavish adherence to
the theory is inappropriate as the touchstone in any analysis of the proper
exercise by a trustee of fiduciary duty in investment:
The modem quantitative and econometric techniques developed in the
last generation have given investors and portfolio managers a new
sense of confidence in the ability to forecast financial trends and
behaviors. By compiling and analyzing historical data, and by
building models that take into account current variables,
econometricians often try to predict the movement of interest rates,
stock prices, inflation, unemployment, and so on. During times of
89.

THOMAS CROFT, UP FROM WALL STREET: THE RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT ALTERNATIVE

28 (2009).
90. Id. The question of the proper application of fiduciary duties in the trustee investment
function is not only important for the direct provision of benefits for the fund beneficiaries, but also
for capital for the global economy, considering the provision of benefits has grown so large.
Professors James Hawley and Andrew Williams have argued that these funds "own the economy" in
the sense of the importance of the capital that they provide for economic activity in the national and
world economy.
JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY
CAPITALISM 100 (2000). For additional information on this view, see ROBERT A.G. MONKS &
NELL MINOW, WATCHING THE WATCHERS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(1996) (exploring the significance of the trust investment function on the world economy). Further,
today such funds are major and active players in the ownership and control of the modem

corporation. Their action or inaction has the possibility to affect the global economy and thus the
investment and political milieu in which their funds exist. Therefore, the operation of the trust
investment function, especially for larger funds, has direct as well as indirect effects as to the assets
held on behalf of beneficiaries.
91. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS EVOLVING, at xviii (2007).
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financial euphoria and investor panic, however, these techniques
become virtually worthless. The reason is fairly simple: The vast
majority of models rest on assumptions about normal and rational
financial behavior. But during market manias, logical and analytical
minds do not prevail. Such markets are driven more by hubris, elation,
fear, pessimism, and the like-emotions that the current models do not,
and perhaps cannot, compute .... 92
Finally, the argument can be made that adherence to MPT does
more harm than good and, in fact, betrays beneficiaries. In light of the

enormity of the bank bailout of 2008 and the continuing large
compensation paid to bank executives, academics have begun to argue
that investing in such banks is a violation of the fiduciary duty of a
pension fund trustee.93 Nassim Taleb, author of The Black Swan and a

professor at New York University, recently wrote, with a co-author:
Why does any investment manager buy the stocks of banks that pay
out very large portions of their earnings to their employees?

Why do portfolio and pension-fund managers hope to receive impunity
from their investors? Isn't it obvious to investors that they are
voluntarily transferring their clients' funds to the pockets of bankers?
Aren't fund managers violating both fiduciary responsibilities and
moral rules? Are they missing the only opportunity we have to
discipline the banks and force them to compete for responsible risktaking?94

Those who defend the status quo often criticize this kind of "negative
screening." 95 However, given the sacrosanct duty of trustees to their
beneficiaries, arguments like Taleb's deserve to be respected.
92. See Bogle, supra note 85, at 24 (quoting

HENRY KAUFMAN, ON MONEY AND MARKETS

303-25 (2001)).
93. See Nassim Nicholas Taleb & Mark Spitznagel, The Great Bank Robbery, PROJECT
SYNDICATE (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/taleb 1/English.
94. Id. Additionally, "[tihe Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
directed [the Government Accountability Office] to conduct a one-time audit of the emergency loan
programs ... authorized by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve
Board) during the recent financial crisis." Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Policies andProcesses
for Managing Emergency Assistance, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (July 21, 2011),
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-1 1-696. This report found that outstanding loans to banks and
other financial institutions topped $1 trillion in late 2008. Id.
95. See Youngdahl, supranote 35, at 23.
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Thus, blind adherence to MPT no longer appears to be sufficient in

fulfilling a trustee's true investment duties to beneficiaries in the real
world of the marketplace.9 6 Current conceptions of fiduciary duty need
to reflect this reality. 97 Given this landscape and the cacophony of the

critics, how can business as usual in investing be considered prudent
activity for those who exercise stringent fiduciary duty on behalf of fund
beneficiaries?
V. FERMENT IN THE LANDSCAPE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY IN
INVESTMENT

In reaction to this landscape, political and regulatory ferment has
erupted. The locus of the most major conflicts involving allowable
investment activities can be found in the area subject to ERISA.98
Pursuant to this statute, the DOL has issued a number of pieces of
guidance that are essentially political99 in nature, cautioning against
certain activities in trustee investments.
96. Due to changes in the investment landscape, the fiduciary duty that normally attaches to
investment professionals who serve fund trustees has eroded, making trustee investment activity
even more crucial. See Bogle, supra note 85, at 22. Bogle wrote, "The idea that fund officials 'act
as fiduciaries, with an eye single on the best interests of fund shareholders' has now been totally
discredited." Id. (quoting MATTHEW FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER'S VIEW 258
(2011)). Speaking of the investment area he knows best, Bogle wrote:
Ever since its provisions were enacted into law more than 70 years ago, the federal
Investment Company Act of 1940 has demanded that funds be "organized, operated, and
managed" in the interest of shareholders rather than fund managers and distributors. But
those provisions have been ignored, lost in the dustbin of history. Paradoxically, it was
only a short time after the 1940 Act became law that the industry's culture, balanced in
favor of stewardship before that standard was enacted, began to shift soon thereafter
toward a balance in favor of salesmanship. In the decades that followed, the interests of
fund shareholders became subservient to the interests of fund managers, and the fund
industry largely became just another consumer products marketing business.
Id. An example of this tension can be seen in the recent backtracking by the DOL, in the face of
industry resistance, over their clarification of the reach of fiduciary status to cover certain
investment professionals. See Youngdahl, supra note 35, at 21.
97. See Halbach, supra note 12, at 1154. Halbach and his fellow drafters seemed to recognize
the likelihood of further refinements in the duty:
The prudent investor project was undertaken with a clear recognition that trust
investment law should reflect and accommodate current knowledge and concepts in the
financial community. While seeking to incorporate the lessons of modem experience
and research, a scrupulous effort was made to avoid either endorsing or excluding
particular theories of economics or investment. In addition, an important objective in
drafting the prudent investor rule was to preserve the flexibility necessary for the
incorporation of future learning and developments.
Id.
98. See Youngdahl, supra note 35, at 5.
99. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1979) (outlining factors to be considered when
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Prior to the passage of ERISA in 1974, policymakers had become
increasingly concerned with the lack of federal regulation of employee

pension plans. l00

ERISA is a powerful statute as it preempts or

supersedes "any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any

employee benefit plan [covered by ERISA]."'O'
mandate the establishment of pension plans nor
minimum level of benefits; instead, it controls the
pension or employee benefit plan once it has been

ERISA does not
does it require a
administration of a
established. 0 2 For

example, ERISA provides, inter alia, that each employee benefit plan
03

shall, in its basic plan document, identify the name of fiduciaries.1
Further, ERISA defines the requirements a fiduciary must meet in order
to satisfy a fiduciary duty in investment. 0 4 For example, ERISA
contains the "prudence" requirement that a fiduciary must act "with the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use
in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character
05
aims."'
like
with
and
Much of the basis of this dispute concerns activities of private
sector labor-affiliated benefit plans.10 6 Authorized by the Taft-Hartley
Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, multi-employer
pension and other benefit plans involving unionized employers take the

determining whether the fiduciary duty of an investor is satisfied). See also Johnson & de Graaf,
supra note 72, at 50 n.12 (stating that investment practices that are not compliant with ERISA
include "excessive investment herding behaviors, obsession with short-term performance and
inattention to systemic risks").
100. See Thomas M. Griffin, Investing Labor Union Pension Funds in Workers: How ERISA
and the Common Law Trust May Benefit Labor by Economically Targeting Investment, 32 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 11, 31-34 (1998) (stating that expansion of pension plans in the 1950s resulted in
widespread abuse, and in response, Congress promulgated various legislation, including ERISA,
which was enacted to protect employee pension plans).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (emphasis added). See also Cal. Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1997) (stating that a state law relates
to an ERISA-covered plan if the law specifically refers to such a plan, "acts immediately and
exclusively upon" the plan, or if the plan's existence "is essential to the law's operation"). The
extent of this relationship remains an unsettled issue in the United States and is sure to be subject to
judicial scrutiny in the near future.
102. See Griffin, supra note 100, at 34.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
104. See Griffin, supra note 100, at 34-40 (describing fiduciary duty of loyalty, duty to be
prudent, and duty of impartiality as ERISA's fiduciary duties of investment).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). This phrase from the statute highlights the definitional issue
discussed above. The description comports with a "prudent investor" standard, yet uses the
"prudent man" language. See id.
106. See Paul M. Secunda, The Forgotten Employee Benefit Crisis: Multiemployer Benefit
Plans on the Brink, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 77, 79 (2011).
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form of a trust, with trustee power shared equally between labor and
management. 10 7 For over a half-century, these benefit plans created
under the Taft-Hartley Act have provided benefits to a specific portion
of working America, particularly laborers, such as construction workers,
who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement and employed by
various employers within one industry.10 8 The Taft-Hartley Act
provides a loose structure with which plans operating under the Act must
comport. 10 9 The wider spectrum of considerations, including fiduciary
responsibility, was generally not discussed at a federal level until the
enactment of ERISA. 110
In this context, the practical meaning of fiduciary duty under
ERISA has become a battleground in the struggle of labor and capital.
The U.S. Supreme Court has said, "ERISA's legislative history confirms
that the Act's [UPIA] fiduciary responsibility provisions . . . 'codifly]
and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles
developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.,",'' Yet, depending on
the administration in power, corporate influence has attempted to impede
what it considers pension fund "activism" under the guise of a "strict"
definition of fiduciary duty." 2 Due to the high stakes concerning the use
of vast pools of capital that exist in employee benefit funds and the
political realities of current American politics, the DOL has issued
guidance to trustees as to the approach they may take in regard to
investment activities that use anything other than Wall Street
considerations. 1 3 In order to make a political point, the guidance has
often ignored the reality of the investment universe today, as well as the
history of the evolution of this trustee duty.
107. See id. at 83.
108. See id. at 79-80. Without the security of Taft-Hartley plans, it would be nearly impossible
for mobile union employees to find portability within their employee benefits. The authority for
Taft-Hartley plans is hidden in the text of the Taft-Hartley Act, as these plans were actually created
as an exception to the general proposition that employers cannot give money, or anything else of
value, to employee representatives. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(a).
109. See29 U.S.C. § 186.
110. See Youngdahl, supra note 35, at 5.
111. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
93-533, at 11 (1973)).
112. See, e.g., Letter from Robert J. Doyle, Dir. of Regulations and Interpretations, U.S. Dep't
of Labor, to Thomas J. Donohue, President and CEO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Dec. 21, 2007)
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ao2007-07a.pdf (detailing the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce's activity in this area). A similar situation exists for trustees that desire to use
economically targeted investments ("ETIs"). See Griffin, supranote 100, at 22-27.
113. This issue first became prominent in the DOL in 1994 during the Clinton Administration.
Youngdahl, supranote 35, at 21 n. 29. Most recently, the DOL issued a government proclamation
under the Bush Administration. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (2008).
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These three factors (the collapse of the certainty of MPT, the
growing understanding of the effects of investment practices on the
long-term real economy, and the political battles in this sector) have
created an unstable environment in which trustees must exercise their
fiduciary duties. Thus, benefit fund trustees in the United States, who
must always consider potential personal liability for breaches of their
fiduciary duties in their investing function, face an unsettled situation.
An outdated interpretation of the concept of the fiduciary duty of
trustees is often the cudgel for a recalcitrance to consider the issue of
sustainability in investment.' 14 Fund attorneys, taking the easy advisory
road, have been slow to step into this breach. This timid approach
contradicts the growing practice in many European countries in which a
more modem conception of fiduciary duty, with strong support for more
sophisticated investment considerations, is moving front and center for
those who invest the monies held to provide pension and other benefits
for the workers of the continent. 115 It is time for the United States and
American fiduciary lawyers to follow this more enlightened approach.

114. See Youngdahl, supra note 35, at 9.
115. See Benjamin J. Richardson, Do the FiduciaryDuties of Pension Funds HinderSocially
Responsible Investment?, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REv. [B.F.L.R.] 145, 191 (2007) (Can.). There is a
philosophical distinction between advocates and critics of MPT that deserves mention. One of the
more interesting new approaches in finance, spearheaded by Lydenberg, is to consider the
difference between "rational" and "reasonable" investment behavior. LYDENBERG, supra note 75,
at 35 n.8. Rational behavior, including that which is defined in current concepts of fiduciary duty in
investment, is self-interested and seeks the most efficient means of achieving one's personal ends.
Id. at 8. It is concerned with the efficient attainment of private goals. See id. While prior laws have
tended to use the term reasonable - reasonable man or reasonable person - the concept has morphed
into a selfish kind of utility. If critics of MPT are correct that conduct of large pension funds has the
tendency to harm the financial system at large, "rational" behavior in investment by trustees in fact
harms beneficiaries. See id. at 9. Focusing solely on whether a particular investment has helped
beat a short-term financial benchmark appears to have had a destabilizing effect on financial
systems, demonstrated by the series of major booms, busts, and financial crises that began in the
first years of the twenty-first century. The strategy of chasing a benchmark has shown itself
incapable of dealing with the implications of investment policies for the sustainability of the
environment specifically and the effects of investments on society generally. Id. at 33-34.
Reasonable behavior, on the other hand, supposes that one takes into account the effect of one's
actions on others. See JON ELSTER, REASON AND RATIONALITY 2 (Steven Rendall trans., 2008). It
is concerned with the protection or enhancement of the common good, a concept that appears more
and more important in our fragile world. Id. Considering the overall duty a trustee owes to a
beneficiary, more "reasonable" behavior seems to be called for. See AmARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF
JUSTICE 48 (2009) (stating that society's "lack of reasoned engagement and action" hinders
sustainability).
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VI. CAN ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNMENT ("ESG")
STRATEGIES BE EMPLOYED UNDER CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY?

This article argues that it is time for a reevaluation of the present
definitions of fiduciary duty in investment, especially in the ERISA
context. The burden on well-meaning trustees is heavy, even with a
settled legal landscape. The current confusion is cruel and unhelpful to
those who are willing to act as trustees and is harmful to their
beneficiaries. 116 Yet, many claim with significant merit that sustainable
investment is allowable today, in spite of occasional DOL guidance to
the contrary.' 17 While a complete replacement theory has yet to be
developed, outlines are appearing." 8 Certain concepts within MPT
remain valid while others are being redefined." 9 Still others that proved
to be counterproductive or failed in practice are being discarded. 120 One
fundamental observation in this new paradigm is that investments play a
major role in the sustainability of the nation and the planet. 121 As
employee benefit trusts are by definition primarily entities that exist to
service long-term obligations to beneficiaries,122 trustees must observe
issues of responsibility and sustainability in society and finance. A
worldwide movement for responsible investment is growing that seeks
to align investment practices with long-term sustainability in investment

116. Paradoxically, in most trust fund meetings for Taft-Hartley funds, for example, the
trustees have the most difficult legal duties and are the least compensated for their work, if they are
compensated at all.
117. See Roger Urwin, Global Head of Investment Content, Watson Wyatt Worldwide,
Address at the Principles for Responsible Investment Academic Conference: Sustainable Investing
Principles:
Models for Institutional Investors 11 (Oct. 1, 2009), available at
http://www.unpri.org/files/UrwinPRl2009.pdf.
118. See, e.g., THE BRANDES INSTITUTE, THE PAST, THE FUTURE, AND MODERN PORTFOLIO
THEORY
5-6
(2004),
available
at
https://www.brandes.com/Institute/Documents/Past%20Future%20MPT%20081604.pdf.
119. See, e.g., BRIAN M. ROM & KATHLEEN W. FERGUSON, POST-MODERN PORTFOLIO
THEORY
COMES
OF
AGE
349
(1993),
available
at
http://www.actuaries.org/AFIR/Colloquia/Orlando/FergusonRom.pdf
(explaining Post-Modem
Portfolio Theory, which modifies MPT in return and risk, and asset allocation concepts).
120. See id. at 354 (concluding MPT's mean-variance methodology is inefficient).
121. See Robert D. Hormats, Under Sec'y for Econ., Energy and Agric. Affairs, Address at the
World Investment Forum: Importance of Investment in the Global Economy (Sept. 6, 2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2010/146894.htm.
122. See EQUITY INCENTIVES LIMITED, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT TRUSTS 2 (2005), available at
http://www.equityincentives.co.uk/documents/pdfs/EBT2005.pdf.
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returns and real economic growth,
spotlighting the importance of this
123
climate for investment returns.
Certainly that is the case in Europe, where nearly all countries have
large benefit funds and some form of a legal fiduciary duty for
trustees. 124 Even Germany, one of the most conservative investing
nations, has seen the use of sustainability criteria in ESG investment to
be required as part of the fiduciary duty in investment. 125 These ESG
concerns of sustainable investment, which are generally associated with
socially responsible investing, employ broader considerations than
simply short-term investment performance. 126 Spurred by concerns
about climate change, oil spills, and corporate malfeasance, ESGinformed investing is becoming an integral part of financial calculations
in the corporate world. 127 In 2009, an official of Starbucks Coffee
Company revealed that it has been lobbying the Obama Administration
for more action on climate change. 128 The company believes climate
change is having a negative impact on coffee production in the world,
which will adversely affect Starbucks's profits and stock price in the
future. 129 Even the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has
issued guidance by counseling companies to pay attention to this
123.

See

The

Principles

for

Responsible

Investment,

PRI,

http://www.unpri.org/principles/index.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
The United Nations
Environment Programme Finance Initiative and United Nations Global Compact have partnered to
develop six principles for responsible investment:
(1) We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making
processes; (2) We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership
policies and practices; (3) We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the
entities in which we invest; (4) We will promote acceptance and implementation of the
Principles within the investment industry; (5) We will work together to enhance our
effectiveness in implementing the Principles; and (6) We will each report on our
activities and progress towards implementing the Principles.
Id.
124. See AXEL HESSE, LONG-TERM AND SUSTAINABLE PENSION INVESTMENTS: A STUDY OF
LEADING
EUROPEAN
PENSION
FUNDS
34
(2008),
available
at

http://webcounter.goweb.de/30889L1NK-O&http://www.sd-m.de/files/Longterm sustainable PensionInvestmentsHesseSD-M Asset4.pdf.
125. Seeid.at4l.
126. See Andrew Ness, The Integrationof ESG in Emerging Markets, PROF. WEALTH MGMT.
(Feb.
7,
2010),
http://www.pwmnet.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/2801/Theintegration of ESG in emerging mark
ets .html.
127. See REMY BRIAND, ROGER URWIN & CHIN PING CHIA, INTEGRATING ESG INTO THE
INVESTMENT PROCESS: FROM ASPIRATION TO EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION 2-3 (2011), available

at http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/news/events/I10922/briandetal.pdf
128. Media Brief, Oxfam Int'l, Business & Climate Change: Dissension in the Ranks (Dec.
2009), available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/business_oxfambrief.pdf.
129. See id.
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matter. 30 Leading accounting firms are observing that "institutional
investors are starting to view financial and non-financial performance as
two sides of the same coin."'' 31 Credit-rating agencies now inquire about
sustainability
practices and tools for measurement of sustainability
2
abound.

13

For those trustees prepared to implement ESG principles in order to
secure long-term sustainable investment returns, Keith L. Johnson and
Frank Jan de Graaf propose general recommendations that can serve as a
guide for the modernization of pension fund legal standards in the
United States. 33 Johnson and de Graaf recommend that the appropriate
regulatory bodies should:
(1) Recognize the risks of excessive investment herding behaviour for
both the economy and fund participants/beneficiaries

.

. . (2)

Emphasize the duty of impartiality and the need to balance short-term
and long-term obligations ... (3) Encourage fee structures that better

align

interests

of

service

participants/beneficiaries

. ..

providers

with

those

of fund

(4) Confirm the importance of systemic

and extra-financial risks (e.g., items not reflected on the financial

130. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Exchange Act
Release Nos. 33-9106, 34-61469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf.
131. CFO's Sustainability Role Still Growing, E&Y Says, ENVTL. LEADER (Aug. 24, 2011),
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2011/08/24/cfos-sustainability-role-still-growing-ey-says/.
The question of the meaning of "non-financial" criteria and their effects on financial performance is
the subject of much discussion and research in the investing community.
132. Id.
133. See Johnson & de Graaf, supra note 72, at 48-49. In addition, the United Nations
Environmental Programme ("UNEP") promulgated recommendations for pension fund trustees,
which should be closely observed and considered. See U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME FIN. INITIATIVE,
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL,
SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 31 (2009), available at

www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/fiduciaryll.pdf (following up the 2005 "Freshfields Report"
infra). They include the following: pension fund trustees must be fully transparent about investment
strategies, including the extent to which the strategies incorporate ESG considerations; trustees
should search out expert advice on proposed investment strategies, including advice on how to
incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making; the pension fund should
express in its Statement of Investment Principles exactly how they take ESG issues into account
when contemplating an investment; trustees should express precisely which ESG issues are to be
considered; trustees should communicate the mid- to long-term return period over which the
performance of the asset manager will be assessed; the asset manager should be required to report
every six to twelve months on the fund and on ESG implementation; the pension fund should adopt
and require the asset manager to adopt the Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) and require
the asset manager to be actively involved in the development of the PRI; and the pension fund
should make sure that the asset manager agrees to periodic independent audits of their
implementation of investments taking into account ESG considerations. Id.
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statements) that could affect the short- or long-term well-being of
participants/beneficiaries . . . (5) Convene a market-specific best
practices commission to develop and maintain general standards aimed
at improving the governance practices of pension funds . . . (6)
Organize
educational
programs
to
promote
fiduciary

professionalism. 134
Assuming the economic effects of ESG activity are always kept
front and center, a keen eye on the whole of fiduciary duties argues that
ESG investing is allowed under U.S. law today. 13 5 In fact, the seminal
"Freshfields Report," written by an international corporate law firm in
the United Kingdom and surveying law in a number of countries
including the United States, states that "there appears to be a consensus
that, so long as ESG considerations are assessed within the context of a
prudent investment plan, ESG considerations can (and, where they affect
estimates of value, risk and return, should) form part of the investment
decision-making process. ' 36
This view is in concert with many
American legal authorities. 137 In The Law of Trusts, the authors wrote:
Trustees in deciding whether to invest in, or to retain, the securities of
a corporation may properly consider the social performance of the
corporation. They may decline to invest in, or to retain, the securities
of corporations whose activities or some of them are contrary to
fundamental and generally accepted ethical principles. They may
consider such matters as pollution, 38
race discrimination, fair
employment, and consumer responsibility. 1
Thus, it is fair to argue that, at the very least, when examining legal
authorities with a view as to how ESG considerations may fit in, ESG
principles may be accorded weight so long as they "are motivated by

134.

Johnson & de Graaf, supra note 72, at 48-49.

135. See FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTEGRATION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 114
(2005),
available
at

http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/freshfields-legal resp_20051123.pdf

[hereinafter

"FRESHFIELDS REPORT"].

136. Id.
137. See id.
138. 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §
227.17, at 500 (4th ed. 1988). The Uniform Management of Public Employee Retirement Systems
Act, adopted in two states, states that a trustee "may consider benefits created by an investment in
addition to investment return only if the trustee determines that the investment providing these
collateral benefits would be prudent even without the collateral benefits." UNiF. MGMT. OF PUB.
EMP. RET. Sys. ACT § 8(a)(5), 7A Pt. III U.L.A. 64 (1997). The DOL view can often be seen as a
similar mandate.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2011

23

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 29:115

proper purposes and do not adversely affect the financial performance of
the entire portfolio."' This is especially the case if the process of ESG
implementation is performed in a prudent manner, keeping the interests
of the beneficiaries always foremost in mind, without slavish adherence
to problematic doctrines. While political considerations within the DOL
might occasionally dictate a different approach, the evidence is
with a powerful and
mounting that ESG investing activity is consistent
40
thoughtful exercise of this fiduciary duty.1
VI. CONCLUSION

Trust law counsels that the performance of investment duties must
conform to societal conceptions of prudent investment and financial
activities.' 41 Given the failures in the previous model, Modem Portfolio
Theory, this legal area must acknowledge that change is necessary in the
definitions of fiduciary duty in investment and in the regulation of those
trustees who exercise such a duty. Trustees must be free to implement
strategies of sustainability when they are exercising their sacrosanct duty
to provide promised benefits to those who labor in America. Twenty
years ago, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts realized the
importance of allowing well-meaning trustees the flexibility to serve
their beneficiaries, as Edward C. Halbach, Jr., wrote:
The rules are designed to be general and flexible enough to adapt to the
changes that may occur over time in the financial world. They are also
designed to be flexible enough to allow prudent use of any investments
and techniques that are suitable to the different abilities of different
trustees and to the varied purposes and circumstances of the diverse
array of trusts to which the prudent investor rule will inevitably apply.
Accordingly, the prudent investor rule is intended to liberate expert
trustees to pursue challenging, rewarding, non-traditional strategies
when appropriate to a particular trust. It is also designed to provide
unsophisticated trustees with reasonably clear guidance to practical

139. FRESHFIELDS REPORT, supra note 135, at 109.
140. Seeid.atllO.
141. See e.g., Christin V. Adkins, Oklahoma Uniform PrudentInvestor Act and Its Influence
on Oklahoma Trust Investment Law, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 1235, 1270 (1997) (concluding that
"the basic premise of trust investment law remains unchanged - a trustee is expected to exercise
reasonable care, skill, and caution when investing and managing trust property"); Melanie B. Leslie,
Trusting Trustees: FiduciaryDuties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 90-94 (2005)
(discussing social and moral norms in trust law and finding that "fiduciary standards embody
commonly accepted and understood social norms").
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courses of investment that are42 readily identifiable, expectedly
rewarding and broadly adaptable. 1
The way trust investments are managed is important for the longterm health of the beneficiaries and the long-term health of society.
Legal definitions of the prudent fiduciary duty in investment should not
constrain the ability of trustees to adequately provide for the well being
of the beneficiaries of their trust. A cautious freedom for trustees who
exercise this function is critical if the accumulated retirement and benefit
funds of American workers will be able to be protected in this uncertain
financial climate.

142.

See Halbach, supra note 12, at 1154-55.
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